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Some problems with the international convergence of accounting
standards: The case of the foreign currency standard
Abstract
For some time, there has been a push towards the harmonistation of accounting
standards throughout the world. Given international trade in corporate securities and
the growth of multinational companies, the harmonisation of accounting standards is
clearly desirable. However, as this paper shows, full harmonisation is unlikely to be
achieved. The reason for this is that accounting standards are not merely technical
rules. They have economic consequences and, thereby, have political implications for
both the preparers and users of financial statements. The fact that economic conditions
vary from country to country, means that accounting methods that are acceptable in
one country may not be acceptable in another. Standard setters must be attuned to
prevailing economic conditions in their own country or they are likely to face
resistance to the standards that are set.
This paper outlines the problems faced by Australian accounting standard setters in the
development of the foreign currency translation standard. The focus of the paper is the
debate over the treatment of translation gains and losses on monetary items. It shows
that harmonisation of accounting standards may be compromised when one country






In an article in the March 1996 edition of Accounting Forum, "International
Convergence of Accounting Standards", the desirability of harmonisation of Australian
accounting standards with those issued by the IASC was outlined (Kropp and
Johnston, 1996). However, as this article will show, that may not always be a viable
approach for Australian standard setters because of local economic conditions and the
large number of groups that may have an interest in accounting standards and,
therefore, attempt to influence their content and application.
Accounting standards have been demonstrated to have economic consequences for
those who must comply with them (eg. ZeIT, 1978) The conceptual framework, in
SAC 2, also recognises a diversity of interested users of financial accounting reports
viz resource providers, recipients of goods and services and parties performing a
review or oversight function. Accounting standards have the potential to impact on
these groups as well as on the preparers of financial reports. The result is, that there is
potentially a very large, perhaps infinite, number of groups with an interest in
accounting standards. While there may be similarities in the composition of interest
groups throughout the world, local economic conditions are likely to be reflected in the
debates concerning appropriate accounting methods for specified transactions. As will
be discussed in the paper, research indicates that standard setters are influenced by
formal submissions dealing with specific accounting standards. It is also possible that
informal submissions, for example, through the press and personal contact such as
telephone calls and private meetings can have an impact on accounting standards.
The development of the standard dealing with foreign currency translation provides
evidence of the difficulties faced by Australian standard setters in achieving a standard
consistent with pronouncements in other countries. The foreign currency standard is,
arguably, one of the most controversial accounting standards in the albeit short history
of the Australian standard setting process. The contentious nature of this standard is
evidenced by the length of time between the issue of the first Australian exposure draft
in 1973 and the issue of two standards, ASRB 1003 Foreign Currency Translation -
Disclosure and AAS 20 Foreign Currency Translation, in 1985. In 1987, ASRB 1003
was withdrawn and replaced with ASRB 1012 Foreign Currency Translation. AAS
20 was subsequently amended to make it compatible with ASRB 1012. This paper will
deal with the Australian approach to the treatment of foreign currency gains and losses
which arise when exchange rates change between the time a transaction is entered into
or recorded in the books of the company and the date of settlement. The treatment of
gains and losses on translation of the accounts of a subsidiary will not be considered
because the decision as to the treatment of subsidiary gains and losses is made once the
translation method, either the temporal or current method, is determined. This was
also a very contentious issue but will not be addressed in this paper.
The paper will take the following format. First, two major alternative treatments of
foreign currency gains and losses on monetary items will be briefly outlined. A short
history will be given of the professional and business support for each method
including reference to the economic conditions prevailing at the time each method was
predominantly in favour. This will be followed by a review of the submissions on the
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various exposure drafts leading to the issue of AAS 20 and ASRB 1012. The apparent
major factors giving rise to the selection of the immediate recognition method over the
defer and amortise approach and the introduction of the concept of a qualifying asset
will then be discussed. The paper will terminate with some concluding comments.
Alternative treatments of foreign currency gains and losses
The accounting treatment of foreign currency gains and losses has a long and
chequered history that is testament to the controversy surrounding this issue and the
importance of prevailing economic conditions at the time an accounting standard is set.
The debate has largely centred on the immediate recognition approach as opposed to
the defer and amortise method. In the struggle to reach consensus on the matter, the
concept of a qualifying asset was introduced and, thereby added a third approach
which permits certain gains or losses to be added to the cost of the asset and
depreciated over its useful life. This innovation appears to be explained by what were
argued to be unique economic circumstances' facing Australian companies, in
particular, that Australian companies are net borrowers of foreign currencies. The US
counterpart, FAS 52 does not contain such a provision. Gains and losses on settlement
of foreign currency transactions are recognised immediately in the profit and loss
account. By contrast, lAS 21 Accounting for the Effects of Changes in Foreign
Exchange Rates allows losses arising from a severe devaluation or depreciation of a
currency where there is no practical means of hedging to be included in the cost of
related assets. However, the Australian standard maintains that this is too permissive
and restricts such treatment to qualifying assets (see AAS 20, Compatibility with
International Accounting Standard lAS 21).
Immediate recognition method
The immediate recognition of gains and losses in the profit and loss account was
favoured in the first Australian exposure draft on accounting for foreign currency
transactions issued in 1973. ED 1973 recommended this practice as being the only
method to provide "adequate accounting and disclosure". It is perhaps relevant that
Kenley found this to be the dominant treatment of translation gains and losses in a
1974-75 survey of 93 Australian companies (Kenley, 1978, pAO). Furthermore,
exchange rates at this point in time tended to be both more stable and favourable to
Australian borrowers of overseas currencies than in subsequent years (Cooper, 1994,
p.472). For example, in the wake of revaluations in the Australian dollar in 1971 and
1972, the financial press reported windfall gains to Australian companies arising from
overseas loans repayable in foreign currencies. Gains of up to $1.5 million were
reported by Hooker Corporation Ltd, Network Finance Ltd, Commercial and General
Acceptance (Ingram, 1973, pp.15, 16), Weeks National Resources Ltd (Dawson-
Grove, 1973, p.28), Consolidated Gold Fields Australia Ltd (Perkins, 1973, p.17),
Newbold General Refractories Ltd (Hornstein, 1973, p.19) and Matheson and Co
(Australia) Pty Ltd (171e Australian Financial Review, 1973a, p.33). Lombard
Australia Ltd reported a $6.5 million gain (771e Australian Financial Review, 1973b,
p.31). In addition, immediate recognition of gains and losses in the profit and loss
account had support at the time in the USA in that FASB 8, issued in 1975, prescribed




There was also qualified support in Canada for the immediate recognition approach. A
report prepared in 1972 for the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA),
Translation of Foreign Currencies (1972), recommended immediate recognition of
gains and losses but only when the change in exchange rate is significant and it is
reasonable to assume it will not reverse in subsequent periods (Parkinson, 1972, p.54).
The rationale behind this restriction was that when exchange rates are subject to
reversal, it is not possible to reliably estimate the ultimate gain or loss (p.55). By the
1980s, there was Australian support for this argument which is probably a reflection of
the change in economic conditions brought about by the floating of the Australian
dollar and other changes in the financial markets (these will be discussed in more detail
later in the paper). This trend away from the immediate recognition of foreign
exchange gains and losses gained momentum and saw it replaced, in some countries,
with a more permissive approach allowing the deferral and amortisation of gains and
losses.
Defer and amortise approach
The defer and amortise method was adopted in the CICA's 1977 exposure draft and
subsequent accounting standard issued in 1983. This approach was also supported by
the International Accounting Committee in lAS 21 issued in 1983 and in the 1979 and
1983 Australian exposure drafts and AAS 20 Foreign Currency Translation issued in
1985. The major arguments in favour of the defer and amortise approach at this time
appear to be based on Parkinson's view that immediate recognition was only
appropriate when exchange rate changes were expected to be permanent (1972, p.55).
Given that exchange rates historically were subject to reversal, translation gains or
losses may never be realised (p.S7). However, deferral of exchange gains or losses
until realisation would be to keep "readers of financial statements in the dark" and deny
them information needed to predict results and assess management performance (p.57).
The compromise solution was deferral and amortisation on a proportionate basis. The
proportion allocated to each accounting period was to be determined by the likelihood
of the gain or loss materialising. This in turn would generally be determined by the
date of maturity of the item concerned. Hence, the closer the maturity date, the
greater the likelihood of the gain or loss materialising and, therefore, the greater the
charge to be made against profit or loss in accounting periods immediately prior to
settlement. Should settlement not be expected until the distant future, the smaller the
proportion of the gain or loss recognised.
A further justification for the adoption of the defer and amortise approach with regard
to long-term monetary items in the 1979 and 1983 Australian exposure drafts and in
AAS 20 in 1985 was that immediate recognition of gains and losses on such items
"may cause undue fluctuations in the results reported from period to period" (ED
1979, paragraph 14). It was further argued in ED 1979 that unamortised exchange
gains and losses had the characteristics of deferred revenue and deferred borrowing
costs respectively (paragraphs 17 and 18). Unamortised exchange losses were to be
classified in the balance sheet as intangible assets while deferred exchange gains would
be shown as deferred revenue. This approach represented a direct reversal of the view
expressed in ED 1973:
S
There is no logical accounting basis, such as matching costs
with revenue, for deferring recognition and spreading gains or
losses over future accounting periods (paragraph 18).
However, as indicated above, this about face on the part of the standard setters may
well have been a reflection of prevailing accounting practice and economic conditions.
In general, having reached a peak in 1972, the Australian dollar subsequently declined
relative to the world's major currencies (Minchin, 1986, p.48). This turn of events saw
a consequential reporting of foreign exchange losses on overseas borrowings and
translation of financial statements as evidenced by reports in the financial press. For
example, for the year ended December 31, 1974, Ciba-Geigy Australia reported a
foreign currency loss of $1,588,712 on Swiss franc loans. The loss resulted not only
from the devaluation of the Australian dollar in September 1974 but also an increase in
the Swiss franc (771e Australian Financial Review, 1975, p.30). Robe River Ltd
reported foreign exchange losses of $540,308 as a result of the devaluation of the
Australian dollar relative to the US dollar. The loss related to foreign loans used to
finance acquisition of fixed assets (771e Australian Financial Review, 1976, pll).
Similarly, in the six months to November 1976, BHP recorded a $20 million loss
resulting from the devaluation of the Australian dollar relative to the US dollar (Byrne,
1977, p.17). As already indicated, Lombard reported a $6.5 million foreign currency
gain in 1973. However, for the six months to March 31, 1977, Lombard reported a
foreign currency loss of $987,000 on the valuation of foreign currency loans due to a
fall in the value of the Australian dollar (Ogg, 1977, p.27).
It is little wonder that by the time the 1979 Australian exposure draft was issued, the
defer and amortise method was already widely used by Australian companies, for
example, BHP, Comaleo, ICI, Hamersley Holdings Limited and Conzinc Riotinto of
Australia Limited (Phillip, 1980, p.29). This trend continued into the 1980s. In a
survey of the top 20 Australian companies (by market capitalisation) in 1985, Eddey
found the defer and amortise option was the preferred accounting treatment of
translation gains and losses at least with regard to long-term monetary items (p22). As
noted earlier, immediate recognition of gains and losses had been the method of choice
in the early to mid-1970s. However, the declining value of the Australian dollar
relative to other world currencies helps explain the change in preferred method of
accounting for foreign exchange gains and losses. The advent of the 1980s re-enforced
the desire for a different approach with the institution of significant changes in the
financial markets in Australia and internationally.
The economic and political climate
In December 1983, the recommendations of the Campbell Committee (Australia, 1981)
were implemented beginning with the floating of the Australian dollar. In addition, the
finance market was progressively deregulated. The floating of the Australian dollar
saw an increase in speculative dealings in the belief that the dollar would appreciate
against the US dollar. This increase in speculative activities did not necessarily provide
the gains expected because the dollar did not appreciate to the extent that speculators
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anticipated (Lovett, 1983, p.11). Furthermore, the 1980s saw the emergence of a
progressively more sophisticated foreign exchange market throughout the world. This
development not only increased speculation and volatility of exchange rates but
lessened the depth and resilience of the foreign exchange market. In world-wide terms,
trading on the foreign exchange market doubled from $US75 billion per day in 1979 to
SUS 150 billion per day in 1985 (AP-Dow Jones, 1985, p.46). By August 1986,
trading was estimated at $US200 billion per day. Australian dollar trade accounted for
$A3 billion of this daily rate (Behrmann, 1986, p.26). This comparatively small
proportion of Australian dollar trade suggests that Australian borrowers and traders
would generally be required to denominate their dealings in a currency other than the
Australian. It is not surprising, therefore, that arguments in favour of the defer and
amortise method were put forward. For example, ED 1979 justified the deferral and
amortisation of unrealised exchange gains and losses in respect of long term
receivables and payables on the grounds that it provided consistent treatment of gains
and losses, was prudent and did not distort results (paragraph 16). Furthermore, the
defer and amortise method was claimed to provide appropriate matching of the cost of
borrowed funds with the benefits arising from the use of those funds. To achieve this,
any gains or losses on foreign borrowings were to be amortised over the period to
settlement of the loan. Eddey further argued that for long-term monetary items the
probability of a gain or loss being realised in a cash flow equivalent was not high
enough to warrant immediate recognition in the profit and loss account of gains or
losses when exchange rates were floating (1985, p.21).
From the time of the issue of ED 1979 until the revision of AAS 20 in 1987, much of
the debate concerning the deferral and amortisation of gains and losses on foreign
currency denominated loans appeared to centre on semantics rather than the merits of
the approach. For example, ED 1979 defined "settlement date" for the purpose of
amortisation of long term monetary items as:
... the date on which a receivable is, or is due to be collected,
or a payable is, or is due to be, paid (paragraph 4 (g)
This was important because, as stated previously, ED 1979 permitted the deferral and
amortisation of unrealised exchange gains and losses in respect of long term
receivables and payables. The definition of "settlement date" was, therefore, pivotal to
the application of the defer and amortise process. However, ED 1983 did not provide
such a definition. ED 1983 continued to permit the defer and amortise option but
qualified its use as applying to long term monetary items having "fixed or ascertainable
lives" (paragraph 10). Exchange differences on such items were to be amortised on a
"systematic basis over the remaining life of the monetary item". The "remaining life of
the monetary item" was not defined. This left open the possibility of never bringing
exchange differences to account by rolling-over the debt.
The question of the treatment of foreign currency gains and losses on short term and
long term monetary items featured strongly in the submissions received.in response to
ED 1983. These submissions are enlightening in that they suggest the validity of
research undertaken by Coombes and Stokes (1985), Morris (1986) and Gavens,
Carnegie and Gibson (1989) that standard setters are influenced by submissions
received.
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A total of 38 written submissions were received. With regard to short term monetary
items, thirteen respondents considered gains and losses on short term monetary items
should always be brought to account in the profit and loss account as incurred. Nine
submissions disagreed. Two of these were qualified in that the respondents did not
think gains should be brought to account. A third submission considered gains and
losses should be included in the cost of purchases. This could be seen as a vote for the
concept of qualifying assets introduced in AAS 20 and Release 406 Foreign Currency
Translation.. Fifteen respondents made no comment on this issue.
On the issue of long term monetary items, only ten respondents agreed that gains or
losses should always be deferred and amortised over the remaining life of the relevant
item. Twenty respondents disagreed but there was not universal agreement on how
these items should be treated. The majority considered gains and losses should be
recognised immediately. Two were clearly in favour of a flexible approach.
The third question addressed in ED 1983 appears to be what gave rise to the
introduction of the concept of qualifying assets. It asked whether exchange gains or
losses on short or long term monetary items should ever be included in the cost of the
asset. This question was in direct contradiction of the exposure draft which maintained
that the purchase of an asset and exchange differences arising from the financing of
acquisition of those assets are two separate transactions. Therefore, exchange
differences should not be included in the measurement of the relevant assets
(paragraphs 8 and 10). Ten respondents indicated a preference for this treatment. Six
disagreed while one wanted a flexible approach. The majority of submissions did not
respond to this question.
One industry submission argued strongly for the inclusion of gains and losses on long
term monetary items to be included in the measurement of an asset which has been
financed by overseas borrowings if the relationship between the two could be
positively identified. The basis of the argument was that if interest on overseas
borrowings could be capitalised up until the commencement of production, then gains
or losses on overseas borrowings should also be capitalised and amortised over the life
of the project. This argument appears to have been persuasive as the concept of
qualifying assets was introduced in AAS 20 and its ASRB identical twin, Release 406,
and became firmly entrenched as part of accounting for foreign currency transactions.
In response to Release 406, the ASRB collated 39 submissions. Of these, a total of35
submissions were actually analysed. Of the remaining four, two submissions were
missing and two recorded in the 39 figure were duplicates. From a review of these
submissions, the most contentious aspect of Release 406 was the definition of
"settlement". Unlike ED 1983, which permitted the amortisation of gains and losses
over the life of the monetary item, Release 406 required any unamortised gain or loss
on long term monetary items to be brought to account in the determination of profit or
loss in the year in which "settlement" occurred (clause .13). The Release 406
definition of settlement was more detailed than that incorporated in ED 1979 but was
more permissive in that it continued the implication of ED 1983 in that roIling over of





(i) extinguishment by repayment (in currency or otherwise),
except where the monetary item is immediately rolled
over within an existing formalised credit arrangement
containing a firm commitment to continue to provide
funds at least equal to the amount of the monetary item
rolled over; or,
(ii) remISSIOn; or
(iii) uncollectability (of a receivable)
While part (i) of this definition meant that the defer and amortise option was available
where a loan was rolled over, it could not be used where there was a renegotiation or
re-financing of debt. This was apparently a departure from the restrictive release
exposure draft of AAS 20 issued for confidential comment in April 1985. According
to one submission, the definition of settlement in that draft included "reconstruction by
renegotiation of terms".
Of the 35 submissions, 19 rejected the Release 406 definition of settlement and argued
that a renegotiation or re-financing of debt should be treated in the same manner as a
rollover. In general, those who disagreed with the definition of settlement and the
treatment of unamortised gains and losses which flowed from it, considered that the
new facility should continue to be amortised. There was some disagreement over the
appropriate period of amortisation but the most favoured time span was over the
shorter of the original and new life of the monetary item. The major arguments
presented in favour of this approach centred on economic consequences and
commercial reality. Many respondents argued that the international market was
becoming increasingly sophisticated and a wide variety of credit arrangements and
facilities were emerging. The provisions of Release 406 were likely to deter
management from taking advantage of alternative credit facilities offering lower
interest rates because of the impact on the profit and loss account of bringing
unamortised gains or losses on the old arrangement to account. In addition, some
respondents considered Release 406 would limit access to major sources of capital as
well as increase the cost of borrowing.
Some respondents noted that the standard made no attempt to justify the defer and
amortise method and failed to provide detailed guidelines on the amortisation method
to be used. It was also noted that the defer and amortise method is a form of income
smoothing. Others, however, argued that while the immediate recognition of gains and
losses on long term monetary items was prescribed by accounting standards in the
USA and UK, it was not valid in the Australian situation because Australia is an
importer of capital and the Australian dollar was a minor currency on world markets.
Both of these factors put Australian companies in a different position to companies in
the USA or the UK. Hence, while harmonisation of standards throughout the world
may be desirable, local conditions may necessitate differences from country to country.
AAS 20, which was identical to Release 406, also attracted attention. In The
Chartered Accountant in Australia of June 1986, the definition of "settlement" in AAS
20 was the subject of discussion by John Miles, chairman of the Accounting Standards
Board (Miles, 1986). As discussed in relation to submissions in response to Release
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406, more than half of the respondents wanted this definition modified to include
renegotiation or re-financing of debt as well as rollovers. According to Miles, the
rollover exception in the definition of settlement was included "following a number of
submissions (1986, p.31). It seems, however, that the AARF had backed away from an
even more permissive approach which would have extended the rollover exclusion to
renegotiation of terms of loans. The renegotiation of terms was part of the definition
of settlement in the exposure draft of AAS 20 restrictively circulated for comment in
April 1985 (Submission on Release 406). Miles did not provide explicit details of why
the renegotiation exclusion was dropped. Some of the problems with the rollover
exclusion were outlined which help explain the AARF's reluctance to extend the
exclusion to renegotiation or re-financing. These problems included the possibility that
the rollover may be in another currency, another facility, with another lender and may
not follow immediately after settlement of the original debt (1986, p32). As the
analysis of submissions on Release 406 has already indicated, commercial reality was a
common ground for extending the rollover exclusion to renegotiation and re-financing.
Miles acknowledged the arguments appeared reasonable but there was no simple
answer (1986, p32). The picture was further clouded by the fact there was no clear
consensus as to the treatment of foreign exchange gains and losses on long term debt.
However, the view towards "settlement" adopted by the Accounting Standards Board
appears to have been that while the defer and amortise option was justified in terms of
the matching concept, it was more difficult to extend the argument to what was
effectively a new loan (Miles, 1986, p32).
A lobby of 14 companies headed by Western Mining Corporation approached the
AARF in a bid to have the "settlement" definition extended but failed (Newsitems,
1986, p18). The Accounting Standards Board maintained there was no precedent for
the treatment of renegotiated or re-financed loans in the accounting standards of other
countries or in terms of generally accepted accounting principles dealing with realised
gains and losses (p 19). This is a valid attitude but it casts some doubt on the AARF's
adherence to the defer and amortise approach which had only marginal support in
international accounting standards.
The introduction of the concept of a qualifying asset in AAS 20 and Release 406
appears to have slipped in unnoticed and unchallenged. Considering the AARF's
approach to the renegotiation or re-financing issue, the inclusion of the concept of a
qualifying asset is mystifying. It also had no precedent in other accounting standards
dealing foreign currency transactions.
The Demise of the defer and amortise approach
During 1986, the vagaries of the foreign exchange market and the losses incurred by
companies were beginning to raise questions about the propriety of the defer and
amortise approach. An article in the Business Review Weekly of August 29, 1986
highlighted the inherent problems with the deferral and amortisation ofgains and losses
on foreign debt (Thomas, 1986, p125). The article reported that Alcan Australia had
written-off $69 million of its unamortised foreign exchange losses incurred on overseas
borrowings. Comments by Alcan's finance controller support the view expressed that
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the defer and amortise approach permitted management to conceal increasing foreign
exchange losses:
Our treatment may well bring into the open a problem among
companies that previously has been hidden away (cited by Thomas,
1986, p125).
Thomas went on to note that in terms of the defer and amortise approach, AAS 20 was
not consistent with UK and US standards and was
... looking increasingly controversial, especially with many big
companies about to enter a recessionary phase with their balance
sheet strength already eroded by injudicious overseas funding
(pI25).
In September 1986, another journalist, Doug Jukes, described AAS 20 as a "lenient
standard" because it permitted the deferral and amortisation ofunrealised losses which
was "out of kilter" with overseas practice where gains and losses on long term
monetary items are written-off as incurred (1986, p144). Jukes also claimed
"confusion reigns" because some companies were writing-off the "now common"
losses to clear the deck so to speak before AAS 20 became operational at October 31,
1986 (p 144). There would have been less confusion if all companies were using the
same method but this was not the case. Alcan wrote its losses off to reserves
(Thomas, 1986, p125; Jukes, 1986, p146). Other companies, including CRA,
Comalco and CSR wrote-off losses through the profit and loss account but did not
include them in operating profit. Santos capitalised $286.5 million in deferred exchange
losses by including them as a component of investments (Jukes, 1986, p146).
While AAS 20 continued to be binding on members of the professional bodies, the
ASRB was not prepared to accept it as an approved accounting standard without
further deliberations and consultation with interested parties. In December 1986,
Release 411 Foreign Currency Translation - Key Issues Questionnaire was issued.
Responses were requested by 2 February 1987. The questionnaire addressed nine
issues including the treatment of unrealised and realised foreign exchange gains and
losses and the definition of settlement.
A total of 36 submissions was received. Six submissions were confidential leaving 30
submissions for analysis. In response to the question of treatment of unrealised gains
and losses, one submission did not address this issue. A total of 9 respondents
supported the immediate recognition approach although 5 respondents qualified their
response. The major exceptions being that immediate recognition should not apply
where transactions were hedged or in respect of qualifying assets.
Twenty submissions supported the defer and amortise approach. Of these twenty, six
considered there should be a measure of flexibility such as the adoption of immediate
recognition where there is a major and permanent realignment of the Australian dollar.
Some companies were already adopting this approach which was also consistent with
AAS 20 paragraph 11.
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The question regarding the treatment of unrealised gains and losses also asked how
"settlement" should be defined. This issue was important because the definition
excluded rollovers and, by implication, included renegotiation and re-financing of
loans. This meant that where a loan was renegotiated or re-financed, any unamortised
gains or losses were to be taken immediately to the profit and loss account. Four
submissions did not address this issue. Of the remaining submissions, 11 supported the
AAS 20 definition while 15 considered renegotiation and re-financing should be treated
in the same manner as rolIovers.
Early in March 1987, the ASRB held a meeting with what was described as "a select
group of respondents" to Release 411 (KilIen, 1987a, pI4). This select group included
BHP, Westpac Banking Corp, CRA, MIM Holdings, the Securities Institute of
Australia and Price Waterhouse. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss
contentious issues arising out of accounting for foreign currency transactions (Killen,
1987a, b) in particular, the defer and amortisation method and definition of settlement.
ASRB Media Release 87/1 - The Saga Ends
On April 3 1987, the ASRB issued Media Release 87/1 which requested the
profession-sponsored AARF resubmit a foreign currency standard providing for
immediate recognition of gains and losses on long term monetary items. The Media
Release stated its decision was based on consideration of international accounting
standards, especially those of the USA and the UK and submissions received in respect
ofRelease 411 and at the discussion forum held in March (ASRB 1987a, pI).
Given what it saw as a lack of consensus on the defer and amortise issue, it appears the
ASRB may have effectively skirted the definition of settlement issue by opting for the
immediate recognition method. Again, there was no clear consensus as to what
constituted "settlement" but if the definition was to remain or be extended to
renegotiation or re-financing, there would be even more scope for manipulation of
accounts. In the extreme, gains or losses may never be brought to account.
In a bid to counter the possible backlash from companies with substantial unamortised
gains or losses, Media Release 87/1 stated that the eventual approved standard would
provide for the writing off of unamortised losses against the opening balance of
retained profits (ASRB 1987b). Media Release 87/1 also stated that, subject to the
consequences of the adoption of the immediate recognition approach, the requirements
of the approved standard would be the same as AAS 20 (p2). This meant that gains
and losses on hedges relating to specific commitments and qualifying assets would be
capitalised and would not be subject to immediate recognition in the profit and loss
account.
In addition to the ASRB' s can for submissions, the AARF was also taking action on
the defer and amortise issue. The Accounting Standards Board of the AARF met late
in March to discuss proposals put forward a week earlier by the ASRB (Killen, 1987c,
p.14). The AARF also issued a press release calling, inter alia, for submissions on the
ASRB's proposals to drop the defer and amortise method of accounting for long term





AARF's press release, 74, is testament to the contentious nature of the issues it raised,
in particular, the defer and amortise issue.
Of the 74 responses, four were either classified as confidential or a non-response. This
left 70 submissions to be analysed. Of the 26 submissions expressing agreement with
the immediate recognition of gains and losses on long term monetary items there were
individuals (5), companies (4), academics (4), government authorities (3), accounting
firms (3), banks and bankers' associations (3), other (20), professional associations (1)
and regulators (1). Four of these respondents, however, did not give unqualified
support. Two respondents would have preferred a more flexible approach but if this
was not an option, immediate recognition was preferred over the defer and amortise
approach. The third submission expressing a qualification to immediate recognition
accepted this approach in order to have consistency between the profession's standards
and those of the ASRB. A fourth qualifier stated that the choice of method was
irrelevant to them but they did have a preference for the immediate recognition
method.
Thirty-five submissions preferred the defer and amortise approach. These represented
submissions from companies (12), government authorities (12), individuals (6),
accounting firms (2), professional associations (2) and banks and bankers' associations
(1).
Four of these respondents did not express unqualified support for the defer and
amortise method. One expressed a clear preference for the defer and amortise method
but recognised that the immediate recognition approach had the merits of being
compatible with USA and UK accounting practice and avoided creative accounting. In
addition, this respondent considered that where there was a major realignment of the
Australian dollar which was expected to be permanent, unamortised losses should then
be written off. This same view was expressed in response to Release 411. Two other
submissions considered the defer and amortise method should only be applied where
the company had hedged the relevant transaction. Another submission considered the
gain or loss should be amortised over the life of the asset not the loan. A further
submission, which was not included with respondents in favour of the defer and
amortise approach, did not directly answer the question but implied support for this
method.
Five submissions expressed a preference for a flexible approach whereby reporting
entities could select the method appropriate to their own situation. Three submissions
did not address the issue at all.
On September 30, 1987, ASRB Media Release 87/4 announced the approval of ASRB
1012 which was to apply to companies as of January 1, 1988 (ASRB 1987c). AAS 20
was re-issued by the AARF in December 1987. As expected, both standards
prescribed the immediate recognition of gains and losses on long term monetary items




In the final analysis, harmonisation with the standards issued by the USA and UK was
achieved to the extent that the immediate recognition of gains and losses is prescribed
in AAS 20 and ASRB 1012 but the Australian standards still have the unique exception
of qualifying assets. An explanation for the inclusion of this variation in the standard
can only be inferred as no 'official' explanation is available. A likely explanation is that
the concept of a qualifying asset was introduced as a result of lobbying activities by
companies. For example, AAS 20 introduced the concept of a qualifying asset
whereby gains and losses on foreign currency loans used to finance the purchase of
assets was included in the cost of the asset. This was in direct contradiction to the
separate transaction philosophy set forward in ED 1983 paragraphs 8 and 10. AAS 20
was subjected to restrictive circulation for comment prior to its release. It is
impossible to determine whether this restrictive circulation was responsible for the
inclusion of the qualifying asset provisions of the standard because the responses to
this release were confidential and are not available for analysis. However, the
provisions of AAS 20 and ASRB 1012 dealing with qualifying assets are almost
identical to a proposal put forward in a submission in response to ED 1983. In
addition, confidential hearings were held with select groups by both the ASRB and the
AARF. It is also possible that non-publicised meetings were held between standard
setters and interested parties.
The overall conclusion is that harmonisation of accounting standards throughout the
world is highly desirable at a time when distance is no barrier to company formation
and trade. However, standard setting is not merely a technical process. It is highly
political and standard setters must be mindful of the social and economic consequences
of standards. While it could be argued that harmonisation was achieved with regard to
the immediate recognition approach, from the publicly available information, there was
not an overwhelming preference for the defer and amortise approach even though the
majority of submissions supported this view. The introduction of the qualifying asset
approach may have been a compromise built into AAS 20 and Release 406 in
anticipation of the eventual need to conform with overseas standards. In other words,
the move towards harmonisation may have give way to local conditions in the form of
variations or flexibility in standards.
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